A comparison of web privacy protection techniques by Mazel, Johan et al.
A comparison of web privacy protection techniques
Johan Mazel
National Institute of Informatics/JFLI
johan.mazel@ssi.gouv.fr
Richard Garnier
ENSIMAG
garnier.richard.s@gmail.com
Kensuke Fukuda
National Institute of Informatics/Sokendai
kensuke@nii.ac.jp
Abstract—Tracking is pervasive on the web. Third party
trackers acquire user data through information leak from
websites, and user browsing history using cookies and device
fingerprinting. In response, several privacy protection techniques
(e.g. the Ghostery browser extension) have been developed. To the
best of our knowledge, our work is the first study that proposes
a reliable methodology for privacy protection comparison, and
extensively compares a wide set of privacy protection techniques.
Our contributions are the following. First, we propose a robust
methodology to compare privacy protection techniques when
crawling many websites, and quantify measurement error. To this
end, we reuse the privacy footprint [1] and apply the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on browsing metrics. This test is likewise applied
to HTML-based metrics to assess webpage quality degradation.
To complement HTML-based metrics, we also design a manual
analysis. Second, we study the overlap of blocking resources
between most popular browser extensions, and compare the
performances using the proposed methodology. We show that
protection techniques have vastly different performances, and
that the best of them exhibit a wide overlap. Next, we analyze
the impact of privacy protection techniques on webpage quality.
We show that automated HTML-based analysis sometimes fails to
expose quality reduction perceived by users. Finally, we provide
a set of usage recommendations for end-users and research rec-
ommendations for the scientific community. Ghostery and uBlock
Origin provide the best trade-off between protection and webpage
quality. Ghostery however requires a configuration step which is
difficult for users. The RequestPolicy Continued and NoScript
extensions exhibit the best performances but reduce webpage
quality. Ghostery and uBlock Origin use manually built blocking
lists which are cumbersome to maintain. Research efforts should
focus on improving existing approaches that do not rely on
blocking lists (such as Privacy badger or MyTrackingChoices),
and automatically building reliable blocking lists.
I. INTRODUCTION
The huge growth of the Internet comes along with an ever-
increasing advertising market. Internet users access content
provided for free by publishers. Consequently, publishers
monetize their audience through advertisement. Companies
thus buy online exposure to promote their products. In order
to maximize advertisement efficiency, advertisers tailor ads to
users regarding their interests. To this end, advertisers leverage
context (e.g. visited website) or previous browsing interests.
Advertisers use techniques such as cookies to identify users
across websites and build their browsing history. Other tech-
niques have also been developed to allow advertising actors
to communicate with each other (such as cookie syncing [2]),
or circumvent cookie removal by respawning cookies using
diverse types of data storage inside the browser (e.g. using
Flash [3]). Browser fingerprinting [4] allows a tracking entity
to follow a user across websites without any in-browser data
storage. In response to these techniques, several counter-
measures were designed. We can here quote the Do Not Track
HTTP header [5] by which a user can ask not to be tracked.
Browsers can also block some or all cookies. Finally, many
browser extensions hinder third party tracking by preventing
cookie creation and/or blocking requests to tracking services.
End-users thus have many techniques available but have
trouble picking one that offers good protection. Similarly, pri-
vacy researchers often want to assess protection efficiency but
do not want to test all available tools. Our goal is to compare
existing privacy protection techniques and provide efficiency-
based recommendations. Some work previously tried to com-
pare privacy protection techniques [6], [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12], [13]. Krishnamurthy et al. [6] provide the first
comparison of privacy protection methods but do not evaluate
most of the browser extensions available today because they
appeared after the publication of the paper. Balebako et al. [8]
focus on a very specific use case: behavioral advertising.
Mayer et al. [7], Hill [9], [10] and Traverso et al. [13]
evaluate 4, 4, 4 and 7 browser extensions on a limited set of
websites (respectively Alexa Top 500, 45, 84 and 100 italian
URLs). Wills et al. [11] crawl a thousand of websites but
use only six browser extensions. Merzdovnik et al. [12] use
five browser extensions. Furthermore, these studies do not
use the same metrics, it is thus difficult to compare their
results. Our extensive coverage improves the state of the art
regarding measurement methodology and error, and evaluated
techniques.
Our contributions are the following. First, we propose a
robust methodology to compare privacy protection techniques
against third party tracking when crawling many websites. To
this end, we reuse the privacy footprint [1] and apply the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on browsing metrics. This test is
likewise applied to HTML-based metrics to assess webpage
quality degradation. We also design a manual analysis to
complement HTML-based metrics. Second, we analyze the
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AdBlock Plus [16] GPL v3 13,917 2.7
uBlock Origin [17] GPL v3 3,759 1.6
Ghostery [18] Proprietary 966 5.4.10
Disconnect [19] GPL v3 204 3.15.3
NoTrace [20] - 0.8 2.4
DoNotTrackMe/Blur [21] Prop. 86 6.0.2091
BeefTaco [22] Apa. 2.0 10 1.3.7.1
H
eu
r. Privacy Badger [23] GPL v3 205 1.0.6
MyTrackingChoices [22] - 0.1 1.0
In
d. NoScript [24] GPL v2 1,765 2.9
RPC [25] GPL v3 6 1.0
O
th
er HTTPSEverywhere [26] GPL v2 353 5.2.5
Decentraleyes [27] MPL 2.0 69 1.2.2
WebOfTrust [28] GPL v3 315 -
TABLE I
PRIVACY PROTECTION TECHNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS. HEUR.:
HEURISTICS ; IND.: INDISCRIMINATE ; POPULARITY (K): POPULARITY IN
THOUSANDS.
blocked resource overlap between privacy protection tech-
niques, and compare their performances. Third, we assess the
impact of privacy protection techniques on website quality. Fi-
nally, we provide recommendations for end-users and scientific
community.
II. BACKGROUND
This section presents an overview of third party web track-
ing and existing privacy protection techniques. We refer the
reader to [14], [15] for a more complete description of these
aspects.
A. Third party web tracking
Websites massively rely on advertisement to monetize user
visit. Advertisers purchase ads for their products directly from
publishers or ad exchanges. When users access websites,
they communicate with all these actors. From the users’
viewpoint, these entities belong to two categories: first and
third parties. First parties are the entities that users intend
to reach, here, publishers. Third parties can be advertisers,
ad exchanges or others actors that provide services to first
parties (such as web analytics). Using techniques such as
cookies, local data storage or fingerprinting, third parties can
identify users across websites. Combining HTTP referrer field
and user identification, they can reconstruct users’ browsing
history. Using cookie syncing, trackers can also exchange user
identification and thus improve data collection.
B. Privacy protection techniques
Several techniques have been designed to protect users
from third party tracking. Network-based techniques use DNS
filtering or proxy. They however exhibit several shortcomings:
proxies cannot analyze encrypted traffic while DNS filter-
ing only blocks entire domains [12]. User agent spoofing
browser extensions may also improve privacy by hindering
fingerprinting, but exhibit poor performance in practice [29].
The next subsections provide a breakdown of browser-related
techniques that we compare in this work. Unless specified
otherwise, these extensions are open source.
1) Extensions: We classify extensions regarding used third
party tracking impediment methods: blocking lists, heuristics,
indiscriminate blocking, or other.
The following browser extensions use blocking lists made
of regex-based rules on domain names. These lists are usually
community maintained. Ghostery [18] is a proprietary, privacy-
focused extension that uses a specific tracker blocking list.
It has recently been bought by the privacy-focused browser
Cliqz [30]. Ghostery requires a configuration step to select
categories of trackers to block. uBlock Origin [17] is a general
purpose blocker. It can also understand the syntax used by
the famous ad-blocker AdBlock Plus. uBlock Origin includes
by default: EasyList, EasyPrivacy, Peter Lowe’s Adservers,
Malware domains and some specific lists. Disconnect [19] is
another blocker. Blur [21] (also known as Do Not Track Me)
is a proprietary extension owned by Abine. It blocks trackers,
protects mail addresses and passwords. NoTrace [20] uses a
wide range of techniques in order to enhance privacy on the
Internet. NoTrace needs to be configured after installation.
One can also block tracking by setting opt-out cookies that
block domains from setting standard cookies. Several entities
[31], [32] provide opt-cookie lists. BeefTaco [33] creates
opt-out cookies in the browser. Another privacy protection
approach uses ad-blockers to hinder tracking in the same way
they block advertisements. AdBlock Plus [16] is the most
popular ad blocker. Using specific lists, it can block trackers,
social widgets, or malwares. Since 2011, AdBlock Plus is
commercially exploited by Eyeo which monetizes domain
whitelisting [34]. In addition to the ad-focused EasyList [35]
that is used by default in AdBlock Plus, there is a privacy-
focused list called EasyPrivacy [35].
Unlike previous extensions relying on blocking list, some
use heuristics to block trackers. Privacy Badger [23] is devel-
oped by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and its behavior
is further described in § V-B. By default, Privacy Badger
uses the Do Not Track HTTP header [5] and strips the
referrer field in HTTP requests. MyTrackingChoices [22] is
an advertisement friendly privacy protection extension. It uses
an hybrid approach which leverages both heuristics similar to
Privacy Badger and blocking list for bootstrapping. Users can
allow tracking for some website categories.
Some extensions indiscriminately block resources NoScript
[24] disables JavaScript. As a side effect, this also disables
some tracking. RequestPolicy Continued [25] blocks all third
party requests.
Finally, some extensions use other mechanisms to pro-
tect users’ privacy. HTTPSEverywhere [26] tries to replace
HTTP connections with HTTPS ones if HTTPS is supported.
WebOfTrust (WOT) [28] provides website rating regarding
trustworthiness and child safety. It was temporarly removed
from extensions stores when it was revealed that WOT broke
privacy rules of browser developers [36]. Decentraleyes uses
local files to emulate resources, e.g. freely available JavaScript
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libraries, hosted on centralized entities. This blocks tracking
from these entities. Table I provides popularity (measured as
the number of users for Firefox), source code license and
version of the extensions used in our work.
2) Browsers: Some browsers also have built-in privacy
protection features. DoNotTrack [5] is a field in the HTTP
header that asks the destination not to track the sender. It was
proposed in 2009 and is currently under standardization in
W3C. This feature is turned off by default in Firefox. The
last proposed amendments to the European Union’s ePrivacy
Regulation hints at an increase interest of policy makers
towards DoNotTrack [37]. Firefox [38] can block cookies:
either all or only third parties’ ones or only third party cookies
from previously visited domains. A tracking protection [39]
has also been added in Firefox version 42. Brave [40] and
Cliqz [41] are browsers that emphasize their privacy protection
features.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Tracking on the Internet
The seminal contribution in the field of web privacy was by
Krishnamurthy et al. They first studied the diffusion of privacy
information [1], then, analyzed the impact of counter-measures
on this diffusion and webpage quality [6], and observed the
increase of user-data aggregation by a small number of entities
[58]. Several works then tried to analyze this phenomenon
with more details by classifying tracking [59] or analyzing
geographical variations of tracking [43], [44].
While early studies focused on cookie-based tracking, two
main new tracking techniques trends emerged: resilient in-
browser data storage [3] and browser fingerprinting [4]. Local
data storage allows one to store data in multiple locations
(for example, Flash Local Storage Object, HTML5 or ETags
among other means) on a device to bypass standard cookie
removal. This technique thus provides resilient local identifier
storage. By using browser fingerprint, a tracker can completely
avoid using and storing an identifier inside the browser and
instead recognize a browser, or the device it is installed
on, using its characteristics such as fonts [60], battery [61],
canvas [62] or hardware level features [63]. Several studies
then tried to detect fingerprinting [64], or both local storage
and fingerprinting [2], [48]. Furthermore, Lerner et al. [65]
show that local storage fingerprinting increased between 1996
and 2016. Another privacy threat is the practice of sharing
user identification across tracking entities. This is called ID-
sharing, cookie-syncing or cookie-matching. While the phe-
nomenon has been documented for some time [66], recent
work analyzed its prevalence in the wild and its impact on
user browsing history sharing among trackers [2], [67], [48].
Finally, the feasibility of user surveillance through bulk
passive network traffic monitoring-based cookie observation
has also been analyzed [47].
B. Automated blocking list building
Many privacy protection tools have been proposed (see
§ II-B). Most of these tools use manually maintained blocking
lists (see Table I). Some proposals automatically build tracking
blocking lists using specific keys in URL that correspond to
user identifying data [52], machine learning on DOM structure
[68], Javascript [53], [55] or user browsing behavior [69]. The
same machine-learning-based approach was also applied to ad-
blocking list building using network traffic features [51].
C. Privacy protection techniques comparison
While some extensions are used in almost all studies (e.g
AdBlock Plus [16] and Ghostery [18]), many of them are
seldom employed. Similarly, some works compare between
four and seven extensions [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]
while another focuses on two [6]. Table II describes how
existing web privacy-related work used or analyzed existing
privacy protection techniques.
Features used to compare privacy protection techniques are
very diverse and thus complicate result comparison across
work. Some works compare privacy protection techniques in
terms of HTTP request number [7], [9], [10], [12], cookie
number [7], [8], [9], [10], domain number [9], [11], [13],
private information diffusion [6], and occurrence of behav-
ioral advertising [8]. Some counter-measure proposals are
also comparing their approaches to others regarding tracker
blocking [49], [50], [39] or impact on browser performance
[22]. Table III lists metrics and features leveraged by existing
web privacy-related studies.
Our work is close to [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]
but improves the state of the art along four axes: protection
techniques, target websites, metrics, and reliability. First,
we compare more protection techniques (15 and additional
combination of blocking lists), than Krishnamurthy et al. [6]
(2), Mayer et al. [7] (4), Balebako et al. [8] (4), Hill [9],
[10] (4), Wills et al. [11] (6), Merzdovnik et al. [12] (5)
and Traverso et al. [13] (7). It is difficult to compare the
extensions covered by our work with Krishnamurthy et al. [6]
since the ecosystem was much simpler at the time (AdBlock
Plus and NoScript were the only extensions available). We
did not use some extensions that were addressed in previous
studies because they are either, not supported anymore (e.g.
TACO which was owned by Abine [8], [56]), or not available
for Firefox (AdBlock [46], [22], [11], Superblock Adblocker
[22], Adremover [22] and Adblock Pro [22]). Furthermore,
AdBlock (resp Firefox Tracking Protection [39]) uses the same
blocking list as AdBlock Plus (resp. Disconnect). By analyzing
AdBlock Plus and Disconnect, we thus provide performance
bounds on these two techniques. Achara et al. [22] and Wills
et al. [11] also evaluated the performance of an ad-blocking
extension that we do not address in this study: AdGuard
Adblocker. Second, we us more websites than most existing
work. We use the Alexa Top 1000 while Mayer et al. [7],
Hill [9], [10] and Traverso et al. [13] use the Alexa Top 500,
45, 84 and 100 URLs, and 100 italian URLs. Balebako et al.
discussed five browsing scenarios that use a small number of
websites to assess the occurrence of behavioral advertising,
we thus cannot compare the websites we use. We crawled a
number of websites similar to Wills et al. [11] but analyzed
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Englehardt et al [47] + + + +
Englehardt et al [48] ©+ ©+ + +
Malandrino et al [49] + + + + +
Privacy Malandrino et al [50] + + + + +
protection Kontaxis et al [39] + +
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Gugelmann et al [51] +? +?
Tracker Metwalley et al [52] © ©
detection Wu et al [53] ?
Yu et al [54] + + +
Ikram et al [55] + + + + +
User Leon et al [56] + + + +
ana. Malandrino et al [57] +
Comp.
Krishnamurthy et al [6] + +
Mayer et al [7] + + + +
Balebako et al [8] + + + +
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Wills et al [11] + + + + + +
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TABLE II
EXTENSIONS USED IN PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS (· FOR USAGE IN THE WILD, © FOR GROUND-TRUTH,  FOR GROUND-TRUTH AND USAGE, + FOR
COMPARISON, ⊕ FOR COMPARISON AND GROUND-TRUTH, ? FOR ML BOOTSTRAPPING , ∼MEANS THAT WE DID NOT EVALUATE THESE TECHNIQUES BUT
THAT THEIR RESULTS CAN BE DERIVED FROM OUR WORK: ADBLOCK USES THE SAME DEFAULT BLOCKING LIST AS ADBLOCK PLUS AND FIREFOX
TRACKING PROTECTION USES THE SAME BLOCKING LIST AS DISCONNECT).
many more protection techniques. We use a smaller number of
crawled websites than Merzdovnik et al. [12] (who uses Alexa
Top 100000) because some of our metrics (such as number of
cookies) require a stateful crawl and thus forbid parallelism.
Third, we use more metrics (see Table III) than any existing
work. We are thus able to provide a better description of
techniques’ performance. We did not compute the host number
metric used by Hill [9], [10] because it is very similar to the
number of domains. This metric actually reflects the internal
network architecture of trackers, which is not relevant for
privacy protection comparison. Finally, none of these work
performs several measurements on each website to remove
measurement error, except Mayer et al. [7] who perform three
crawls for each URL but does not provide any justification
for this number. To the best our knowledge, we here propose
the first measurement error analysis for privacy protection
technique comparison (see § V-A).
IV. METHODOLOGY
This section presents data collection and used metrics for
privacy protection and webpage quality.
A. Data collection
We use OpenWPM [48], an open-source framework written
in Python that relies on Selenium for browser automation.
OpenWPM supports Firefox and provides some extensions.
With minor modifications, we add extensions presented in
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Table I and § II-B. This study has been conducted with Firefox
45.
We crawl the highest-ranked websites by Alexa [70]. Unless
stated otherwise, we perform measurements in August 2017,
using IP addresses located in Japan. Typically, a crawl on
the Alexa Top 1000 (§ VI-A) takes about three days with
commodity hardware.
B. Privacy protection
In this section, we present our robust methodology to
compare privacy protection techniques across several websites
and using several metrics. We also present privacy footprint
[1].
1) Browsing metrics: As explained in § II-A, privacy leak-
age occurs through communications with trackers, and local
data storage (e.g. cookie) allows trackers to easily identify
users across website. We consider five simple browsing-related
metrics that reflect the ability of protection techniques to
hinder these two phenomena. We first focus on HTTP requests.
We separately count the requests that are made to the accessed
domain (the number of first party requests), and the requests
that are made to other domains (the number of third party
requests). To this end, we use the second level domain name
obtained from the Public Suffix List [71]. These metrics give a
rough estimation on the performance of a particular extension.
A protection technique is effective if the number of first
party requests is not impacted, and the number of third party
requests decreases.
The third metric is the number of third party domains
accessed during a crawl. This is complementary to the number
of third party requests. It provides a metric on the number of
blocked entities. There may be a few domains that generate
a lot of requests, or a many domains that produce a few
requests. Efficient protection techniques reduce the number of
third party domains.
This is however not sufficient since third party requests
are not always used to track users, they can also provide
content to users (e.g. media resources) or contact non-tracking
third parties (e.g. website analytics). The fourth metric is the
number of the profile cookies obtained from a stateful crawl.
Protection techniques with good performances diminish the
number of cookies.
The last metric is the total amount of data transferred.
It is especially important in low-bandwidth situations for
example on mobile. This metric is directly related to tracking
and advertisement. Advertisement often generates considerable
traffic during browsing. However, as we will see in § V-A, this
metric shows high variability when crawling the same website.
We thus did not use this metric in our analysis.
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Fig. 1. Example of ECDF of the mean number of third party requests for
all websites in the Alexa Top 1000 with two configurations: default Firefox
(bare) and Firefox with uBlock Origin. The arrow represents the KS statistic.
2) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test-based browsing metrics com-
parison: While the metrics introduced in § IV-B1 provide
a good estimation of the privacy protection for a particu-
lar website, summarizing this aspect for a set of websites
is non-trivial. Figure 1 presents two empirical cumulative
distribution functions (ECDFs) built on the mean number
of third party requests sent, for each website of the Alexa
Top 1000 world. We use the mean of each metrics for ten
crawls to reduce measurement error (see § V-A). We here
use two Firefox configurations: one without any extension
(bare) and one with uBlock Origin. To determine whether
one Firefox configuration exhibits the same performance as
another, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (or KS) test. It is a
non-parametric test that does not make any assumption on the
underlying distributions which fit our context. This test relies
on the KS-statistic which is the maximum difference between
two cumulative distributions. The KS statistic is represented
by the arrow on Figure 1. The null hypothesis is that both
ECDFs belong to the same distribution. In our case, this
means that both configurations have the same performance.
We use a significance level α of 0.05. If the p-value of the
KS-test is smaller than α, we consider the two ECDFs as
distinct. In other words, the two considered configurations
have performances that are statistically different.
3) Privacy footprint: In this work, we also use the privacy
footprint proposed by Krishnamurthy et al. [1]. The privacy
footprint represents interactions between first parties and third
parties (i.e. potential trackers) in a graph. For each third party
accessed by the user when visiting a first party, an edge is
added between the nodes representing the considered first and
third parties. Privacy footprint thus captures both the potential
information leaking from first parties, and the aggregating
behavior of third parties. Krishnamurthy et al. [1] used the
second-level domain name of the authoritative DNS server of
third parties to group domains in the same entity on the same
node in the graph. This method is called ADNS. Krishnamurthy
et al. [58] then noticed that unrelated third parties located on
the same hosting service or Content Delivery Network (CDN)
are grouped together by ADNS because they share authoritative
DNS servers. They thus develop a new method called root.
With root, if a third party is located in a hosting service
or a CDN, the second-level domain-name of the third party
domain is the node identifier. Otherwise, as with ADNS, the
second-level domain name of the authoritative DNS server of
the considered third party is the node.
We use three metrics that are built on the graph. (1) the
number of third parties reveals tracking breadth. (2) the mean
number of third parties per first party corresponds to tracking
intensity. (3) the number of first parties associated with the top
10 third parties estimates how much tracking is concentrated
on the most prominent third parties.
C. Webpage quality
Privacy protection techniques prevent privacy informa-
tion leakage by hindering of communications with trackers
and blocking cookie creation, among other techniques. This
may however have negative side-effects on webpage quality.
Blocked third party domains may actually host images or
JavaScript that are needed to render the webpage correctly. We
first analyze the impact of privacy protection on browsing data
in an automated fashion. We then perform a manual analysis to
assess privacy protection repercussion on rendered webpage.
1) HMTL-based metrics: Our goal is to detect layout dif-
ferences or missing elements that may reduce webpage quality
both in terms of rendering quality and functionality. We crawl
HTML data using OpenWPM. We devise several metrics that
analyze the browsed page. The first metric is the HTML page
size. We then derive two metrics from the crawled HTML data
itself: number of images and scripts. The last two metrics are
the total size of images and scripts. For all metrics, a reduction
is associated with a webpage quality decrease. We here reuse
the metric comparison method presented in § IV-B2.
2) Manual analysis: By analyzing HTML, we are able to
determine how many elements and how much data is missing
when privacy protection is used. This, however, does not
assess how well the webpage is rendered inside the browser.
We thus perform a manual analysis to determine webpage
quality obtained with privacy protection techniques. Webpage
screenshots are captured using OpenWPM. First, we want
to determine whether privacy protection techniques impact
webpage layout. Our first question thus is: “Please rate layout
similarity between Bare (left) and Extension (right).”. Good
layout similarity, however, does not guarantee lack of missing
elements. The next step is to compare webpage elements when
privacy protection is used and not used. We want to avoid
comparing elements of the same webpages that may change
for different users or crawling time (e.g. news items). We thus
ask user to focus on webpage elements that are part of the
user interface. Our second question thus is: “Please rate the
proportion of elements (image, text frame, widgets, etc.) of the
user interface (e.g.: login button, tabs, etc, but not news items
or pictures) in Bare (left) that are also in Extension (right)”.
For both questions, users give a rating between 0 and 10, 0
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Fig. 2. Relative standard error of the mean of browsing metrics in function
of the number of measurements when accessing www.yahoo.jp. Solid lines
represent the median, dashed lines correspond to 5 and 95-centiles.
being the worst and 10 the best. Our manual analysis was
performed by six users.
V. MEASUREMENT PARAMETERS
We address two measurement parameters: the impact of
crawling parameters on measurement error, and the training
of Privacy Badger.
A. Impact of crawling parameters on measurement error
During our preliminary experiment, we notice that measure-
ment results are not stable. Querying twice a website usually
yields two different metric values. To determine the appropri-
ate number of measurements that generates a small error, we
conducted a detailed study on the website showing the high-
est variability in our preliminary experiment: www.yahoo.jp.
These measurements were performed is November 2016. Vary-
ing the number of measurements, we computed the relative
standard error of the mean of four browsing metrics.
Figure 2 shows that the relative standard error decreases
when the number of measurements increases. Performing ten
crawls reduces the relative standard error on the number of first
party requests, third party requests, and third party domains to
less than 5%. The number of bytes received, however, still has
a large error, we thus discard this metric. One possible reasons
for this measurement error is the webpage advertisement
churn. Guha et al. [72] analyze ad churn during page reloads.
They show that the number of unique new ads increases
quickly during the first ten reloads but only linearly thereafter.
This further justifies our choice to use ten measurements. An
existing comparison of privacy protection techniques [7] uses
three crawls for each website and extension. They however
do not motivate this choice nor provided measurement error
analysis.
Figure 3 is the ECDF of the relative standard error of the
mean of the number of first and third party requests, and
of the number of third party domains for all websites in
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Fig. 3. ECDF of the relative standard error of the mean of browsing metrics
on the Alexa Top 1000 websites crawled ten times. Vertical dashed lines
represent the relative standard error for www.yahoo.jp.
the Alexa Top 1000 crawled 10 times. Most websites have
a relative standard error smaller than that of www.yahoo.jp
(here in dashed lines). Overall, 99% of websites have a relative
standard error smaller than 1% for all observed features.
B. Privacy Badger training
Privacy Badger employs heuristics to determine if a domain
is performing tracking (see § II-B1). Privacy Badger measures
the number of times that a domain reads a cookie as a
third party. When this number is greater than three, the
considered domain is blocked. On top of this, cookies are also
whitelisted using heuristics. This behavior causes a freshly
installed Privacy Badger not to block any domain. As the
user browses websites, more and more domains are blocked.
To fairly evaluate Privacy Badger, we analyze the impact of
Privacy Badger training. In other words, we intend to quantify
how many websites need to be accessed to ensure that Privacy
Badger is completely trained.
If we were to determine the number of websites regular
users need to browse to train Privacy Badger, we should use
a browsing model such as AOL search logs [73] as Roesner
et al. [59] do. Our use-case here is however to ensure that
Privacy Badger is trained for a specific set of websites. We
thus measure Privacy Badger’s performance on the Alexa Top
100 websites after training. These crawls were performed is
November 2016. This training consists of several repeated
crawls targeting the same set of websites and performed
without reinitializing the user profile, i.e. Privacy Badger
continues its training. We use zero to five successive training
crawls and then perform a single measurement crawl.
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 4. The
dashed line corresponds to a reference: crawling results of
a bare browser. KS test groups the six measurements with
Privacy Badger together, but separates them from the bare
browser. Without training, Privacy Badger is already able to
7
2600
2800
3000
3200
3400
# 
1s
t p
ar
ty
 re
q.
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
7500
8000
# 
3r
d 
pa
rty
 re
q.
220
240
260
280
300
320
340
# 
3r
d 
pa
rty
 d
om
.
0 1 2 3 4 5
# of training crawls
650700
750800
850900
9501000
# 
co
ok
ie
s
Fig. 4. Performances of Privacy Badger depending on the number of crawl
performed for its training. The horizontal dashed line represents a default
Firefox as reference.
provide partial protection. After a single training pass, the
number of third party requests is reduced by 10.3%. The
results however do not improve when the number of training
crawl increases. We also ran a single training crawl on the
Alexa Top 500 websites and observed similar performance as
with a single training crawl. The training is thus complete
with less than one crawl (here one hundred websites). My-
TrackingChoices uses the same principle but without Privacy
Badger’s cookie data-based white-listing heuristics. One can
thus expect MyTrackingChoices to train faster. Moreover,
MyTrackingChoices is provided with a small bootstrapping
tracker list which should further reduce training time. For the
remainder of this paper, we train Privacy Badger using a single
crawl on the considered Alexa Top websites. Out of the four
existing work that uses Privacy Badger [55], [9], [12], [13],
only two actually peform some training [9], [12]. We here
provide the first estimation of how much website needs to be
visited to complete Privacy Badger’s training.
VI. RESULTS
A. Privacy protection
We compare protection techniques, first in terms of perfor-
mance and then, regarding their blocking overlap.
1) Browsing metrics: We perform a general comparison
of privacy protection techniques. We crawled the Alexa Top
1000 World using 21 different browser configurations. One
configuration is the default setup of the Firefox browser (Bare).
One configuration is Firefox setup with the DoNotTrack
HTTP header. Two configurations use Firefox’s ability to
block cookies: third party ones or third party cookies except
from previously visited websites. We do not use complete
cookie blocking because we hypothesize that users want to
keep using cookie for some domains. Three configurations
set up AdBlock Plus with various lists: EasyList, EasyList
and EasyPrivacy and a filter set similar to uBlock Origin
(EasyList, EasyPrivacy, Peter Lowe’s Ad Server list and Mal-
ware domains). One configuration uses NoTrace with the high
preset (the default configuration has no effect on our metrics).
The last 14 configurations are extensions with their default
setting. We do not use the Firefox Tracking Protection [39]
because OpenWPM does not support it yet. However, this
technique uses the Disconnect blocking list. This means that
by analyzing Disconnect, we provide a performance bound on
Firefox Tracking Protection’s performances. The results are
shown in Figure 5. The number on top of technique name is
the KS-based rank (see § IV-B2).
All techniques have a limited impact on first party requests.
The most aggressive technique is NoScript [24]. This is due
to the fact that Javascript is pervasive on Internet. Other
techniques exhibit a limited impact on th enumber of blocked
first party requests.
Except for the number of cookies, the two most effective
extensions are RequestPolicy Continued and NoScript which
reduce the number of third party HTTP requests by 96% and
87%. However, as shown in § VI-B and other studies [6], [50],
they strongly impact webpage quality.
Among other techniques, Ghostery [18] and uBlock Origin
[17] provide the best performances. They reduce the number
of third party HTTP requests by 58% and 55%. Ghostery
however needs to be configured which is difficult for users
[56]. AdBlock Plus [16] uBO-like has similar performances
with uBlock Origin and Ghostery. Our results show that
users can manually setup AdBlock to obtain good results,
unfortunately this is difficult [56]. Furthermore, AdBlock Plus
used with EasyList is much more CPU and memory-hungry
than uBlock Origin [22].
Another group of techniques provides average perfor-
mances: Disconnect (and Firefox Tracking Protection), Ad-
Block Plus (with EasyList and EasyList + EasyPrivacy),
Privacy Badger, Blur, BeefTaco and NoTrace. Their results
are mostly consistent across third party requests and domains,
and cookies. Privacy Badger [23], Blur [21], Disconnect [19]
and AdBlock Plus with the EasyList block a relatively large
number of third party HTTP requests (between 33% and 48%),
but a fairly small number of third party domains (between 8%
and 33%). We hypothesize that these techniques block the
main trackers but fail to impact the tracking long-tail [48].
MyTrackingChoices performances are worse than untrained
Privacy Badger. We hypothesize that this is due to a GUI
bug that forbids users from customizing website categories
where blocking occurs. MyTrackingChoices thus always block
tracking on 13 websites categories out of 32. BeefTaco has a
noticeable impact on cookies but no impact on other metrics.
This is consistent with previously observed tracking long tail
[48]. This phenomenom makes the opt-out cookie maintenance
very difficult while the protection that they offer is limited
to cookie blocking. NoTrace [20] provides average protection
despite being setup at its highest level. NoTrace increases
users’ online privacy awareness [57], but unfortunately, users
cannot reliably setup the extensions [56] which is required.
Remaining techniques provide poor protection. Decen-
8
PB
 (t
ra
in
ed
) -
 7
PB
 - 
7
FF
 B
ar
e 
- 7
FF
 D
NT
 - 
7
FF
 n
o 
3P
C 
- 7
De
ce
nt
r. 
- 7
Be
ef
Ta
co
 - 
7
FF
 n
o 
3P
C 
EV
 - 
7
W
OT
 - 
7
MT
C 
- 6
HT
TP
S 
Ev
e.
 - 
6
Di
sc
on
ne
ct
 - 
5
No
Tr
ac
e 
- 5
Bl
ur
 - 
4
AB
P 
EL
 - 
4
Gh
os
te
ry
 - 
4
AB
P 
EL
+E
P 
- 3
uB
loc
kO
rig
in
 - 
3
AB
P 
uB
o-
lik
e 
- 3
RP
C 
- 2
No
Sc
rip
t -
 1
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
Nb
 re
qu
es
ts
 1
st
 p
ar
ty
(a) # first party requests
No
Tr
ac
e 
- 1
1
W
OT
 - 
10
De
ce
nt
r. 
- 9
FF
 B
ar
e 
- 9
FF
 D
NT
 - 
9
FF
 n
o 
3P
C 
- 9
FF
 n
o 
3P
C 
EV
 - 
9
HT
TP
S 
Ev
e.
 - 
9
Be
ef
Ta
co
 - 
8
MT
C 
- 8
PB
 - 
7
PB
 (t
ra
in
ed
) -
 6
AB
P 
EL
 - 
6
Di
sc
on
ne
ct
 - 
5
Bl
ur
 - 
5
AB
P 
EL
+E
P 
- 4
uB
loc
kO
rig
in
 - 
3
AB
P 
uB
o-
lik
e 
- 3
Gh
os
te
ry
 - 
3
No
Sc
rip
t -
 2
RP
C 
- 1
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
Nb
 re
qu
es
ts
 3
rd
 p
ar
ty
(b) # third party requests
W
OT
 - 
15
De
ce
nt
r. 
- 1
4
FF
 B
ar
e 
- 1
4
FF
 D
NT
 - 
14
HT
TP
S 
Ev
e.
 - 
14
Be
ef
Ta
co
 - 
14
MT
C 
- 1
3
PB
 - 
12
No
Tr
ac
e 
- 1
1
FF
 n
o 
3P
C 
- 1
0
FF
 n
o 
3P
C 
EV
 - 
10
PB
 (t
ra
in
ed
) -
 9
Di
sc
on
ne
ct
 - 
8
Bl
ur
 - 
7
AB
P 
EL
 - 
6
Gh
os
te
ry
 - 
5
AB
P 
EL
+E
P 
- 4
uB
loc
kO
rig
in
 - 
3
AB
P 
uB
o-
lik
e 
- 3
No
Sc
rip
t -
 2
RP
C 
- 1
0
500
1000
1500
2000
Nb
 d
om
ai
n
(c) # third party domains
W
OT
 - 
15
FF
 B
ar
e 
- 1
4
De
ce
nt
r. 
- 1
4
HT
TP
S 
Ev
e.
 - 
14
FF
 D
NT
 - 
14
Be
ef
Ta
co
 - 
13
MT
C 
- 1
2
PB
 - 
11
No
Tr
ac
e 
- 1
0
AB
P 
EL
 - 
9
PB
 (t
ra
in
ed
) -
 8
FF
 n
o 
3P
C 
EV
 - 
7
Bl
ur
 - 
6
Di
sc
on
ne
ct
 - 
5
FF
 n
o 
3P
C 
- 4
AB
P 
EL
+E
P 
- 3
uB
loc
kO
rig
in
 - 
2
Gh
os
te
ry
 - 
2
AB
P 
uB
o-
lik
e 
- 2
No
Sc
rip
t -
 1
RP
C 
- 1
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
Nb
 c
oo
ki
e
(d) # cookies
Fig. 5. Performance comparison of protection techniques regarding the mean # first party request, mean # third party requests, mean # third party domains
and # cookies. Each metric value corresponds to the total obtained by crawling the Alexa Top 1000 websites. The mean and standard deviation are computed
on ten crawls. The number on top of technique name is the KS-based rank. Bare: Firefox alone, MTC: MyTrackingChoices, PB: Privacy Badger, FF no 3PC:
Firefox no 3rd party cookie, FF no 3PC EV: Firefox no 3rd party cookie blocking except from previously visited domains, ABP: AdBlockPlus, EL: EasyList,
EP: EasyPrivacy, RPC: RequestPolicy Continued . AdBlock Plus uBo-like uses all uBlock Origin’s lists except uBlock Origin’s specific ones; it thus loads
EasyList, EasyPrivacy, Peter Lowe’s Ad Server list and Malware domains.
traleyes [27] has almost no effect on the results. We hypoth-
esize that blocking library loading requests only marginally
impacts HTTP traffic. The DoNotTrack HTTP header [5] also
has barely no effect. If trackers complied with DoNotTrack,
the number of cookies would significantly drop. We thus
conclude that DoNotTrack is not respected by most trackers.
WebOfTrust and HTTPSEverywhere have no effect.
We note that WebOfTrust and NoTrace both yield signifi-
cantly more third party requests than Firefox without any ex-
tensions. WebOfTrust also contacts more third party domains
and increases the number of cookies. WebOfTrust annotate
hyperlinks in webpages with trust rating. We hypothesize that
this rating is obtained from WebOfTrust servers and thus
impact our metrics. We do not have any explanation regarding
NoTrace’s behavior.
When we block third party cookies in Firefox, there is a
reduction in the number of third party domains. Blocking
cookies also slightly reduces the number of third party re-
quests. As hypothesized in [48], this may be due to impeded
cookie-syncing interactions. However, contrary to Englehardt
et al. [48], third party cookie blocking here has poor perfor-
mances. This may be due to the fact that, unlike [48], we
perform a stateful crawl. In a previous study [47] that uses
stateful crawl and OpenWPM, third party cookie blocking also
exhibits poor performances. The metric used in this study is
however extremely specific, it thus is very difficult to compare
our results with theirs. Furthermore, some third parties from
the Alexa Top 1000 are first party at some point (e.g. Twitter,
Facebook). Their cookies are thus created as first parties.
2) Privacy footprint: We then compared extensions using
the privacy footprint (see § IV-B3 and [1]). Figure 6 presents
these results. They are similar to browsing metrics’ Figure 5.
Six extensions exhibit much better results than the rest:
RequestPolicy Continued, NoScript, Ghostery, uBlock Origin
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Fig. 6. Privacy footprint [1], [58] for the Alexa Top 1000 world. The mean
and standard deviation are computed on the metric value of the ten crawl. EV:
Firefox no 3rd party cookie blocking except from previously visited domains,
ABP: AdBlockPlus, EL: EasyList, EP: EasyPrivacy.
and AdBlock Plus with uBlock Origin’s list. For RequestPolicy
Continued, the mean number of third parties per first party is
very small while the total number of third parties is much
higher. This means that some third parties are detected but
that they are present on a limited set of first parties. NoScript
results are here close to Ghostery’s. The hierarchy between
Ghostery, uBlock Origin and the customized AdBlock Plus is
here very clear and follows this order. We hypothesized that
the uniqueness of Ghostery and uBlock Origin blocking lists
(see § VI-A3) is the main factor of their superior performances.
3) Overlap: Next, we measure the overlap between the
five extensions among the most popular ones regarding the
number of blocked third party requests and blocked third
party domains using a matrix view. We here data crawled on
the Alexa Top 100 websites in November 2016. We do not
analyze NoScript [24] (resp. RequestPolicy Continued [25])
here because it indiscriminately blocks Javascript (resp. third
party requests). Privacy Badger has been trained on the Alexa
Top 100 websites and each extension is used with its default
blocking list. AdBlock Plus uses the EasyList. uBlock Origin
loads EasyList, EasyPrivacy, Peter Lowe’s Ad Server list,
Malware domains, and some uBlock specific lists. Ghostery
is set up with all its filter categories, while Disconnect is
employed with its own filters.
Let us consider two extensions. Let Ei be the extension on
the row i, and Ej the extension on the column j. The resources
blocked by Ei (resp. Ej) are noted Bi (resp. Bj). On the left
(resp. top), the green (resp. purple) square on row i (resp.
column j) represents the total number of resource blocked by
Ei (resp. Ej). On each line i of the matrix, the surface of the
square represents the total number of resources blocked by Ei:
|Bi|. The inner purple square on row i and column j represents
the intersection between Ei and Ej and its surface is |Bi∩Bj |.
The diagonal orange square surface displays resources that are
only blocked by Ei: |Bi − {Bk∀k 6= i}|.
As an example, we see AdBlock Plus on the second line
of Fig. 7a. Square surfaces on this line represent the number
of third party requests blocked by AdBlock Plus: 1356. The
first square on the considered line represents the intersection
with Privacy Badger which is encoded by the surface of the
inner purple square, here 678. The green surface outside the
purple square describes the resources blocked by AdBlock
Plus but not by Privacy Badger. The next square on this line is
located on the diagonal, and represents the resources blocked
by AdBlock Plus only. Remaining squares on this line depicts
intersections with Disconnect, Ghostery and uBlock Origin in
the same fashion as the intersection with Privacy badger is
represented (see above).
The overlap of the third party requests (Fig. 7a) shows that
there is a big overlap across all extensions. All third party re-
quests blocked by Privacy Badger are also blocked by uBlock
Origin. Similarly, Ghostery almost completely covers Privacy
Badger. Despite using two different blocking techniques, lists
and heuristics, these extensions exhibit a significant overlap.
This proves that the Privacy Badger’s heuristics are reliable.
Results on the third party domains on Fig. 7b are similar
to Figure 7a. The major difference is that Privacy Badger’s
impact is smaller. This is consistent with the heuristics be-
havior (see § V-B) that only block third party domains that
are seen across several websites. These heuristics thus have
trouble blocking less prominent trackers [48].
Both figures illustrate that Ghostery and uBlock Origin
block many specific resources that other extensions do not
block. We speculate that this is due the fact that their blocking
list settings are unique. This may explain why they exhibit the
best performance (see § VI-A1).
Some resources are only blocked by AdBlock Plus. It
however uses EasyList which is also employed by uBlock
Origin. The ten crawls made with AdBlock Plus may have
reached some third parties that were not contacted during
the ten measurements made with uBlock Origin. We thus
hypothesize that this observation is another side-effect of the
ad churn observed by Guha et al. [72].
Summary: The most popular extensions show a wide over-
lap. Ghostery and uBlock Origin block specific resources that
are not affected by other extensions. In terms of overall privacy
protection, RequestPolicyContinued and NoScript show the
best performances. Ghostery and uBlock Origin protect users
slightly less. Remaining techniques provide average to low
protection. The DoNotTrack HTTP header provides almost no
protection.
B. Webpage quality
We finally analyze how privacy protection techniques im-
pact website quality. We use an HTML-based automated
approach and perform a manual analysis.
1) HTML metrics: We crawl the Alexa Top 100 world on
the 21 different browser configurations of § VI-A1. We use
the metrics presented in § IV-C1 and the ranking method
exposed in § IV-B2. Figure 8 presents the results. We discard
10
(a) # third party requests (b) # third party domains
Fig. 7. Overlap of third party requests and domains blocked by five extensions (PB: Privacy Badger, Dis: Disconnect, ADB: AdBlock Plus, Gho: Ghostery,
uBO: uBlock Origin). Square surfaces represent the metric value for the extension on the row.
the HTML size metric because there is no significant change
across protection techniques. NoScript has a noticeable impact
on all metrics. This is especially visible for the script number,
and image and script size. RequestPolicy Continued’s impact is
smaller than NoScript’s except for image size. We hypothesize
that RequestPolicy Continued blocks third party image hosting
services, and thus impacts many websites. NoScript greatly
reduces the total size of scripts which is consistent with its
goal: blocking JavaScript on webpages. Other privacy protec-
tion techniques appear to have a limited impact of website
quality. Compared to other techniques, Ghostery exhibits a
smaller impact on images and a higher reduction of the number
of script and their total size. This is consistent with its tracking
protection goal. This extension actually does not intend to
block media such as advertisements.
2) Manual analysis: The previous subsubsection analyzes
webpages quality in terms of HTML and associated data. This
automated approach does not necessarily reflect the quality
of the rendered webpage. We perform a manual analysis to
cope with this limitation. We gather screenshots of the Alexa
Top 50 without pages from the same entity but with distinct
localization (e.g. Google and Amazon). These screenshots
were gathered in November 2016. We use the seven techniques
that provided the best privacy protection (see § VI-A1): Privacy
Badger trained, Blur, Disconnect, uBlock Origin, Ghostery,
NoScript and RequestPolicy Continued. For each webpage and
protection technique, we display a picture that contains two
screenshots side-to-side to the user: the left one captured with
Firefox alone, the other with Firefox used with an extension.
We use the questions about layout similarity and missing
elements presented in § IV-C2. Figure 9 exposes our results.
The blue (resp. red) boxplot corresponds to the first (resp.
second) question. Overall, Privacy Badger, Blur, Disconnect,
uBlockOrigin and Ghostery have a very small impact on ren-
dered webpages. On the other hand, RequestPolicy Continued
and NoScript significantly impact on pages both in terms of
layout and missing elements. This is consistent with § VI-B1
and previous results [6], [50]. The manual analysis uncovers
RequestPolicy Continued’s strong impact on webpage quality
which was not exposed by HTML-based metrics.
Summary: Both studies show that RequestPolicyContinued
and NoScript reduce webpage quality. Other extensions do not
have such impact.
C. Summary
Figure 10 summarizes our findings. Each metric-based
synthetic index is build as the mean of previously used
metrics (see § IV-B1 § IV-C1) normalized using the metric
value obtained with Firefox used alone. Manual analysis-
based index is the mean of the mean rating of both ques-
tions. Figure 10a shows that our manual analysis captures
the negative effects of RequestPolicy Continued that are not
visible with HTML-based metrics. Figures 10b and 10c
demonstrate RequestPolicy Continued and NoScript show the
best protection performances but impact browsing experience.
Ghostery and uBlock Origin protect users slightly less but have
a smaller impact on webpage quality. Remaining techniques
provide average protection.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of protection techniques’ website quality regarding: number of image and scripts and size of images and scripts. We crawled the Alexa
Top 100 websites. The mean and standard deviation are computed on ten crawls. The number on top of technique name is the KS-based rank. Bare: Firefox
alone, FF: Firefox feature, MTC: MyTrackingChoices, PB (trained): Privacy Badger (trained), FF no 3rd coo. EV: Firefox no 3rd party cookie blocking except
from previously visited domains, ABP: AdBlockPlus, EL: EasyList, EP: EasyPrivacy, RPC: Request Policy Continued. AdBlock Plus uBo-like uses all uBlock
Origin’s lists except uBlock Origin’s specific ones; it thus loads EasyList, EasyPrivacy, Peter Lowe’s Ad Server list and Malware domains.
VII. DISCUSSIONS
A. Recommendations
Our analysis shows that RequestPolicy Continued and No-
script are the most effective privacy protection techniques.
Similarly to previous work [6], [50], we confirm that they
affect webpage quality. Users that want to avoid website
breakage can instead use uBlock Origin or Ghostery. The latter
however needs to be configured which is difficult for users
[56]. We note that previous work [12], [13] also recommended
uBlock Origin and Ghostery. Their results were however noisy
(percentiles are overlapping in [13] and some techniques
actually observed more fingerprintting than the default browser
in [12]) due to the use of single crawl to each website. Our
robust measurement methodology does not suffer from the
same weakness, and show that uBlock Origin or Ghostery
exhibit statistically better performance than other techniques.
Previous network traffic monitoring studies [46], [74] show
that users are more preoccupied by blocking ads than tracking.
Malloy et al. [75] show that ad-blockers usage vary between
18% and 37% in analyzed countries (US, UK, Germany,
France, and Canada). Metwalley et al. show [46] that 10 to
18% of users had installed AdBlock Plus while less than 3.5%
(resp. 2%) were using DoNotTrackMe/Blur (resp. Ghostery).
Similarly, Pujol et al. [74] speculate that out of the 19.7%
of users that install AdBlock Plus, less than 15% of them
setup the EasyPrivacy list. We show that the default setup
of AdBlock Plus has average performances but that it can
be configured to achieve good results. This task is however
difficult for users [56]. We thus advise ad-blocking users that
want to improve their privacy to directly change to more
efficient extensions (see above).
Extensions that do not rely on manually maintained filters,
Privacy Badger and MyTrackingChoices, exhibit average per-
formances. It however is not clear how their performances
may be improved. Analyzing extensions’ behavior against
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Fig. 9. Webpage quality manual analysis. Users are presented two screenshots
obtained with Firefox alone and with a privacy protection technique. The first
question (blue) asks user to rate layout similarity. The second question (red)
corresponds to the proportion of elements observed with Firefox alone also
present when a privacy protection technique is used. Screenshots are captured
on the Alexa Top 50. Boxplots extend to the upper and lower quartile and
contain a line that represents the median. Dashed lines show min/max range.
When not visible, median is located on top of the upper quartile.
existing blocking lists would help to improve their results.
Blocking list-based protection techniques are efficient but their
scalability is limited due to human intervention. Current efforts
[68], [52], [53], [51], [55] to automatically build blocking list
are thus extremely relevant.
Ghostery and uBlock Origin block a significant amount of
resources that are not blocked by other protection techniques.
Both should thus be considered as relevant when assessing
users’ ability to protect themselves.
B. Limitations
In this work, we estimate the impact of privacy protection
techniques on webpage quality in terms of missing elements
and data (using HTML-based metrics § IV-C1 and alteration to
the webpage layout and elements (using a user manual analysis
§ IV-C2). We however do not address the functionality loss.
We intend to explore this aspect in future work along two
axes. We plan to explore each website beyond its homepage
to improve website coverage.
Several work [59], [68], [51], [52], [53], [55] automatically
build blocking lists. We did not evaluate them because pro-
duced lists are not publicly available.
Evaluated approaches aim at blocking tracking. One side ef-
fect is advertisement blocking. These approaches thus threaten
the current economic model of many publishers on the Inter-
net. Techniques examined in this work however do not have the
same impact on third party tracking. For example, Ghostery
and MyTrackingChoices can block tracking for specific web-
site categories. Similarly, Firefox’s third party cookie blocking
only partially impacts advertisement techniques (such as Real-
Time Bidding, RTB) that rely on user interests. Olejnik et al.
[67] show that new users (i.e. users without any browsing his-
tory) are less valued by advertisers. A user that blocks all third
parties cookies thus reduces his customer value for advertisers,
and, consequently, publisher’s revenue. This however does not
completely block tracking and thus, advertisement transactions
(e.g. bidding in RTB). Indiscriminate third party blocking
techniques (such as RequestPolicy Continued [25]) however
have a much bigger impact on advertising. They for example
block interactions between ad exchange and bidders in the
case of RTB. All privacy protection techniques presented in
this work may thus have very different impact on advertising.
We intend to address this aspect in future work.
Ghostery [18] and MyTrackingChoices [22] can block track-
ing for specific website categories, and thus, allow monetiza-
tion for others. This is obviously less aggressive than most
approaches addressed in this work. Achara et al. [22] however
report that 30% of users block the tracking for all categories.
These users thus have no reason to use these two techniques
instead of other ones.
C. Future work
As shown in § III, existing work uses a vast array of metrics.
Some of them are tailored to very specific use cases (such
as behavioral advertising [8], [45] and cookie-based mass-
surveillance [47]). Similarly, data-related metrics present an
obvious interest in a mobile context. We intend to add new
metrics to this work. We also want to analyze the impact of
all these protection techniques on specific attacks (browser
fingerprinting [4], [48], cookie syncing [67], [2], [76], [48]).
Analyzing extensions inside other browsers, such as
Chrome, Internet Explorer or Opera, would provide a wider
picture of privacy protection techniques in the wild. Sele-
nium, the browser automation framework used by OpenWPM,
supports these browsers. OpenWPM, however, currently only
supports Firefox. Furthermore, browsers include more and
more privacy protection (e.g. Firefox [39], Brave [40], Cliqz
[54]). Cliqz and Brave are not supported by Selenium, which
make both browsers impossible to use with OpenWPM (see
§ IV-A). We however intend to add them later on.
While some works use domain name-based heuristics [77],
[67] to identify third parties, others use blocking lists-based
extensions as ground-truth (see Table II). When the latter
method is used, tracking’s long tail [48] may cause many
false negatives. Beyond our analysis in § VI-A, we intend
to investigate blocking lists more thoroughly.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This work extensively compares existing privacy protection
techniques against third party tracking and provides four
contributions. First, we propose a robust methodology to
compare privacy protection techniques when crawling many
websites, and quantify measurement error. We use the privacy
footprint [1] and apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test on
browsing metrics to evaluate privacy protection. This test is
likewise applied to HTML-based metrics to assess the impact
on webpage quality. We also design a manual analysis to
complement HTML-based metrics. Our second contribution is
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Fig. 10. Scatter plots of synthetic index for privacy protection, HTML-based quality and manual analysis-based quality.
a privacy protection techniques comparison in terms of overlap
and performances. We show that the most popular privacy
protection techniques exhibit a common blocking baseline. We
also highlight the fact that some extensions, namely Ghostery
and uBlock Origin, have a very specific behavior and are the
only ones to block some domains. Our third contribution is
a comparison of the impact of privacy protection techniques
on webpage quality. Our fourth contribution is a set of usage
recommendations for end-users, and research recommendation
for the scientific community. Ghostery and uBlock Origin
provide the best trade-off between protection and webpage
quality. Ghostery however requires a configuration step which
is difficult for users [56]. The RequestPolicy Continued and
NoScript extensions exhibit the best performances but reduce
webpage quality. Ghostery and uBlock Origin use manually
built blocking lists which are cumbersome to maintain. Re-
search efforts should focus on improving existing approaches
that do not rely on blocking lists (such as Privacy Badger or
MyTrackingChoices) and automating blocking list building.
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